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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Regulation and Energy Poverty in the United States 
 
 
by 
 
 
Michael C. Jensen, Master of Science 
 
Utah State University, 2017 
 
 
Major Professor: Dr. William F. Shughart, II. 
Department: Economics & Finance 
 
 
An affordable utility bill is considered to represent six percent of household 
income. According to recent research, however, energy costs now represent 20 percent or 
more of income for many American families. A discussion of energy poverty largely is 
missing from the debate about America’s future, as the call to address climate change by 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, at any cost, influences policymakers strongly. For 
families on fixed incomes, rising energy prices mean that the gap between what they can 
afford to pay and what they are paying for electricity is widening. Our research evaluates 
the regressive effects of regulation by studying how such regulation impacts residential 
energy expenditures, and therefore the household energy burden. 
(91 pages) 
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT 
 
 
Regulation and Energy Poverty in the United States 
 
Michael C. Jensen 
 
 Energy poverty is a topic often neglected in the discussion about global climate 
change. Apocalyptic prophecies about the negative future effects of climate change 
ignore the suffering of people around the globe whose lives could be drastically improved 
with access to reliable sources of energy. Though energy poverty from a global 
perspective is much more serious than energy poverty from a domestic perspective, high 
home energy bills are a serious cause for concern for many Americans. 
 This research examines the relationship between regulation, the prices of 
electricity and natural gas, and the household energy burden, which is the ratio of 
household energy expenditures to household income. Where the household energy 
burden exceeds six percent of household income, households are at the brink of living 
with a high household energy burden. High household energy burdens can become a 
generational poverty trap, so understanding what contributes to a high household energy 
burden may help decision makers determine how to proceed when shaping energy-related 
and poverty-related policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
On August 3, 2015, President Barack Obama and the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency announced the final version of the Clean Power Plan, a regulation 
designed to limit carbon dioxide emissions from power plants. This first-of-its-kind 
regulation was highly controversial, and the Clean Power Plan quickly became the “most 
litigated environmental regulation ever, with 39 separate lawsuits filed against it in the 
D.C. Circuit by 157 different petitioners” (Small 2016). 
Supporters of the Clean Power Plan argued that the regulation would result in 
substantial human health benefits, and that it was a necessary step in combating climate 
change. Opponents argued that the regulation would kill jobs, actually do little to prevent 
climate change, and that the burden of complying with the regulation would fall most 
heavily on low- and middle-income American households. 
As I researched and wrote about the Clean Power Plan, I became interested in  
understanding how energy and environmental regulation affect American households. In  
particular, I began to explore the relationship between regulation and household energy  
expenditures, which led me to the topic of energy poverty. 
 
 
Energy Poverty 
 
 
Energy poverty is “a lack of [household] access to … electricity and clean 
cooking facilities,” where clean cooking facilities are defined as “fuels and stoves that do 
not cause air pollution in houses” (International Energy Agency 2017). The International 
Energy Agency estimates that 1.1 billion people, approximately fifteen percent of the 
world’s population, do not have household access to electricity and that 2.8 billion 
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people, approximately forty percent of the world’s population, lack clean cooking 
facilities (Ibid. 2017). The agency further estimates that a lack of clean cooking facilities 
leads to 3.5 million people dying prematurely every year, due to “household air pollution 
resulting from the traditional use of solid fuels, such as fuelwood and charcoal” (Ibid. 
2016, 14). 
 Though my research is not focused on global energy poverty, understanding 
global energy poverty is necessary to properly frame energy poverty in the United States. 
Owing to high living standards, the discussion of American energy poverty has been 
expanded to include more than mere access to electricity and clean cooking facilities. 
Instead, the discussion of American energy poverty focuses on the percentage of 
household income spent on household energy (electricity and natural gas, primarily). 
Thus, it is important to distinguish between energy poverty in the United States, where 
energy is accessible though perhaps expensive, and global energy poverty, which is truly 
a poverty of energy. 
 Because energy poverty in the United States is in most cases not truly a poverty of 
energy, it is more appropriate to speak in terms of a person or household’s energy burden. 
Energy burden is the ratio of energy expenditures to income. Individuals or households 
with a large energy-expenditure-to-income ratio have a high energy burden. People with 
high energy burdens are generally the people discussed when lobbyists and policymakers 
talk about energy poverty in the United States. As I will discuss later, household energy 
prices in the United States have been, on average, stable over the past thirty years, so it is 
ironic that energy poverty has become an increasing public policy issue at a time when 
energy is becoming cheaper. 
  
3 
Summary of Findings 
 
 
 The relationship between regulation and household energy burden is not clear. 
The empirical evidence is not supportive of my expectation that an increase in regulation 
affecting the price of energy would increase both the household energy burden and the 
number of households with a high energy burden. In my thesis, I propose several 
explanations for this unexpected finding. 
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ENERGY POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
 
 As mentioned in the introduction, energy poverty in the United States is in most 
cases not truly a poverty of energy. The number of U.S. households that meet the 
International Energy Agency’s definition of living in energy poverty (no electricity and 
no clean cooking facility) is small enough that in the United States the term energy 
poverty is instead used to describe people who have access to electricity, but who pay 
large percentages of their incomes for that access. Thus, describing such households as 
being in energy poverty can be misleading. It is more accurate to instead discuss the high 
energy burden of low-income households, and I will therefore use “high energy burden” 
in place of “energy poverty” for the remainder of this thesis. 
 
Energy Burden 
 
 
 Energy burden is the ratio of household energy expenditures to household income. 
At the household level, several types of energy burden exist: residential energy burden, 
transportation energy burden, and total energy burden. Residential energy burden is the 
ratio of residential energy expenditures to household income, where residential energy 
expenditures are the amounts spent to provide energy to a residence, such as for keeping 
the lights on, the refrigerator running, and heating or cooling the home. Transportation 
energy burden is the ratio of transportation energy expenditures to household income, 
where transportation energy expenditures are the cost of using energy to travel to 
workplaces or shopping centers, such as paying for gasoline or to charge an electric 
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vehicle’s battery. The total energy burden is the sum of residential and transportation 
energy burdens.  
 Each type of energy burden mentioned above can be measured in at least two 
ways, using a household energy burden or a group energy burden approach. In this paper, 
I am concerned only with the residential energy burden, so I will leave study of the 
transportation and total energy burden for future research, but the following discussion on 
the household and group approaches to measuring the energy burden applies to all three 
types of energy burdens. 
 The Division of Energy Assistance of the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (2016, 90) outlines two ways of computing energy burden, using a household or 
group approach, explained as follows: 
 
Household Energy Burden 
 
 The household energy burden (sometimes referred to in the energy burden 
literature as the individual energy burden) is the ratio of household energy expenditures 
to household income. It is “the burden placed on household incomes by the cost of 
residential energy” (Ibid. 2016, 89). 
 Thus, for example, a household with $2,000 in annual residential energy 
expenditures and an annual household income of $40,000 would have a household 
residential energy burden of five percent. 
 The household energy burden can be aggregated to find its central tendency for a 
given population. Consider a population of four households with energy with energy 
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burdens of, respectively, four, five, seven, and eight percent. The mean (and median) 
household energy burden for that population would be six percent (Ibid. 2016, p. 90). 
 
Group Energy Burden 
 
 Though household-level data provide a more accurate understanding of the range 
and central tendency and range of energy burdens, such data may not be available. When 
household-level data are not available, but group-aggregated information is, the group 
approach to studying the energy burden is appropriate. 
 The group energy burden, which is the average energy burden for each household 
or individual in the group, is the ratio of the group’s total residential energy expenditures 
to the group’s total income (Ibid.). 
 For example, consider a population of four households for which information 
about how much each household spends on energy or how much each household earns 
each year is not available. The researcher is, however, able to access information 
indicating that the combined energy bill of the four households is $4,000 and that total 
income for the four households is $100,000. The group energy burden for this population 
of houses would then be four percent. (Ibid.). 
 The group approach to studying the energy burden offers a way around 
unavailable household-level data, but the group approach suffers from the problem 
inherent to studying averages: it tells us little about what is happening within a 
population. Thus, when the group energy burden approach is the only method available 
because of data availability issues, critical analysis is handicapped. 
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Low-Income Households and  
High Energy Burdens 
 
 
 Again, given an understanding of energy poverty from a global perspective, 
broadly categorizing Americans who allocate larger percentages of their household 
incomes to heating and cooling as being in energy poverty is an abuse of language. A 
more appropriate way to describe such households is to state that they face heavy 
residential energy burdens. Doing so appropriately differentiates people who have access 
to energy sources, such as electricity and natural gas, from people who do not have 
access to such energy sources, and who therefore are truly energy impoverished. 
 Still, American energy poverty is not merely on the list of #firstworldproblems. A 
survey of U.S. households that receive help paying home energy bills through the federal 
Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP), for example, demonstrates 
how a large home energy bill, as a percentage of income, exacerbates the problems 
associated with a low household income: 24 percent of surveyed LIHEAP recipients 
reported going without food for at least one day, 37 percent went without medical or 
dental care, and 19 percent had someone in the home who became sick because the home 
was too cold (National Energy Assistance Directors’ Association 2011, iii). Though a 
high energy bill isn’t the only problem low-income households face, a high energy bill 
may mean that, on the margin, people are choosing between eating and keeping the house 
warm (Bhattacharya, DeLeire, Haider, and Currie 2003).1 
                                                      
1 This is, of course, only one example of the many tradeoffs low-income 
individuals may make when choosing how to allocate their money to meet 
their needs. The heart of the question I’m interested in asks how the 
choices made by policymakers limits or expands the choices people are 
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 Furthermore, in a 2007 study on homelessness in Colorado, researchers from the 
University of Colorado at Denver stated that the high cost of utilities was one of the most 
commonly cited reasons for homelessness (O’Brien, Appelbaum, Velez-Badar, and Buck 
2007). Thus, not only do high household energy costs make life difficult for low-income 
American households, but high costs can contribute to people losing access to a house, 
electricity, and clean cooking facilities—pushing them out of their homes and into energy 
poverty. 
 Additionally, the need to maintain a supply of energy to a household in the face of 
mounting utility expenses can result in an intergenerational debt transfer. When parents 
are unable to pay the utility debt down, they may choose to open accounts with the utility 
company in their child’s name. And when those parents unable to pay the utility bills 
transfer debt to their children in order to keep energy coming into the home, they create 
“involuntary debt traps for minors and other household members” (Hernandez and Bird 
2016). 
 Government housing policies are intended to “create and maintain opportunities 
for low-income families to live in affordable rental housing” (Ibid.). However, these 
policies distort the cost of rental housing, and the housing subsidies may draw in tenants 
who would otherwise be unable to afford to live on their own. This then creates a 
problem of high residential energy burden for such tenants because they mistook the 
subsidy as a signal that housing was affordable. On the margin, such housing policies 
may increase the number of low-income households living with a high energy burden.  
                                                      
able to make when deciding how to allocate “scarce resources which have 
alternative uses” (Sowell 2014). 
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The same government housing policies that subsidize housing, and therefore 
allow more low-income individuals and households to live separately, create a situation 
known as the “split incentive problem” (Ibid.). Almost 80 percent of the nearly 40 million 
households eligible for federal heating assistance pay the utility bills for the units they 
rent (Ibid.). This means that neither the landlords nor the renters have a vested interest in 
improving the energy efficiency of the home—the landlords because they don’t capture 
the benefits of energy savings, and the renters because they tend to not live in the unit 
long enough to make the investment in energy efficiency pay off (Ibid.). Thus, low-
income households are drawn into housing and residential energy burdens that they 
struggle to afford. In effect, such subsidies nudge people into living with a high energy 
burden.  
 There is no universally-recognized percentage of income spent on residential 
energy that defines whether or not a household has a high energy burden. Economist 
Roger Colton, however, indicates that six percent of household income is a benchmark 
for an affordable energy burden (Fisher Sheehan & Colton 2016), and the Applied Public 
Policy Research Institute for Study and Evaluation suggests that eleven percent of 
household income be the benchmark for households living with a high energy burden 
(2007, iv). 
Another way to approach the discussion of high energy burden is to discuss what 
does not constitute an unreasonable energy burden. In the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services’ LIHEAP Home Energy Notebook: For Fiscal Year 2014, the Division 
of Energy Assistance estimated mean and median residential energy burden for four 
household categories: all U.S. households, U.S. non-low-income households, U.S. low 
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income households, and LIHEAP recipient households (2016, 97-98). As Table 1 shows, 
in every region, non-low-income households had a mean burden of between 2% and 4% 
and a median burden of between 2% and 3% (Ibid.). Low income households had a mean 
burden ranging from 11% to 21% and a median burden of 5% to 11%, LIHEAP recipient 
households were similar to the low-income households (Ibid.). 
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Table 1: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services FY 2014 Household Residential 
Energy Burden 
 
 
 
(U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2016, 97-98) 
 
 
Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) 
 
 
 In order to alleviate the burden of high energy costs for low income households, 
every year Congress appropriates funding for the Low-Income Household Energy 
Assistance Program (LIHEAP). Funding is then apportioned to the 50 states and the 
District of Columbia, 153 Native American tribes, and five U.S. territories (collectively 
called the grantees) to “operate home energy assistance programs for low-income 
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households” (Perl 2015, Summary). LIHEAP funding primarily is used to help 
households pay their heating and cooling bills (Office of Community Services 2016). 
 Authorized by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, the Low-Income 
Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) is “a block grant program administered by 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services” (Division of Energy Assistance n.d., 
i). The program’s purpose is “to assist low-income households, particularly those with the 
lowest incomes, that pay a high proportion of household income for home energy, 
primarily in meeting their immediate home energy needs” (Ibid.).  
 Federal law requires that states and other LIHEAP grantees use two methods for 
determining whether a household is eligible to receive LIHEAP aid: eligibility based on 
income and eligibility based on receipt of other benefits (Perl 2015, 4). Eligibility based 
on income requires that states and other LIHEAP grantees set eligibility at no more than 
“150% of the federal poverty income guidelines or, if greater, 60% of the state median 
income,” and must not declare ineligible any household with income “below 110% of the 
poverty guidelines” (Ibid.). Eligibility based on receipt of other benefits allows states and 
other LIHEAP grantees to qualify “any household of which at least one member is a 
recipient of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI), benefits under the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, 
formerly Food Stamps), or certain needs-tested veterans’ programs” (Ibid.). Furthermore, 
42 U.S.C. §8624(b)(3) requires that grantees reach out to low income households with 
high energy burdens (U.S. Government Publishing Office). 
 Although the law requires that LIHEAP funding be used to help low income 
households with high energy burdens, LIHEAP is not an entitlement program. Financial 
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aid is awarded on a first-come, first-served, basis and the National Energy Assistance 
Directors’ Association (NEADA) indicates that about only 20% of LIHEAP-eligible 
households receive financial aid before funding runs out (2017). Figure 1 shows for the 
years 2000-2011 the number of households eligible for LIHEAP funding and the number 
of households that actually received LIHEAP assistance, for the years 2000-2011 (Perl 
2015, p. 9). 
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Figure 1: LIHEAP Recipients FY 2000-2011 
 
 
 
(Perl 2015, p. 9) 
 
 
 Congress grants two types of LIHEAP funding: regular funds (also called block 
grant funds) and emergency funds. While emergency funds are awarded “at the discretion 
of the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services based on emergency 
need,” regular funds are allocated by formula (Perl 2015, Summary). The formula used to 
allocate funding for LIHEAP is a composite of what are known as the “old” and “new” 
formulas (Ibid.). 
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 When Congress enacted LIHEAP in 1981, the program replaced the Low-Income 
Energy Assistance Program (LIEAP) but adopted the same formula used for LIEAP to 
determine how funds would be allocated to the states. Under LIEAP, cold-weather states 
benefitted over warm-weather states, as the funding primarily was meant to aid in heating 
homes, rather than cooling them. This allocation method is known as the old formula.  
 In 1984, Congress reauthorized LIHEAP and changed the allocation formula to 
more equally benefit warm-weather states more equally. Congress also included two 
hold-harmless provisions that would prevent LIHEAP funds from being unduly awarded 
to warm-weather states at the expense of the funding historically awarded to cold-weather 
states (Ibid.). This allocation method is known as the new formula, and the amount of 
money allocated for LIHEAP every year determines which formula is used to determine 
how LIHEAP funding is allocated across states (Ibid.).2 
Although LIHEAP is not the only federal energy assistance program, it comprises 
the most significant portion of federal funding for home energy assistance programs. 
Figure 2 shows the total funding allocated for home energy assistance programs from FY 
1977 through 2017. Figure 2 also shows the significant increase in funding for home 
energy assistance programs in 1981 when Congress created LIHEAP. (LIHEAP 
Clearinghouse n.d.). Figure 3 shows the total funding allocation for LIHEAP only, from 
FY 2007 to 2014 (Perl 2015, p. 33).  
                                                      
2 The new formula was used to allocate funds in FY 1985, FY 1986, FY 
2006, and FY 2008 (apparently mistakenly). From FY 2009 to at least FY 
2015, Congress has allocated funds using both the old and the new 
formulas, dictating that certain amounts be allocated according to the old 
formula and certain amounts allocated according to the new formula (Perl 
2015, Summary). 
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Figure 2: Total Home Energy Assistance Funding FY 1977-2017 
 
 
 
(LIHEAP Clearinghouse n.d.) 
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Figure 3: Total LIHEAP Funding FY 2007-2014 
 
 
 
(Perl 2015, p. 33) 
 
 
Home Energy Affordability Gap 
 
 
 In 2003, economists from Fisher, Sheehan & Colton (FSC) “introduced a model 
that calculated the dollar amount by which ‘actual’ home energy bills exceed ‘affordable’ 
home energy bills on a county-by-county basis” for the United States (FSC 2016). They 
called the gap between actual and affordable home energy bills the Home Energy 
Affordability Gap (HEAG). Figure 4 shows HEAG from 2011 to 2016 (FSC 2017).3 
                                                      
3 Owing to a change in data sources and an update to methodology, the 
Home Energy Affordability Gap data prior to 2012 is not comparable to 
the data in 2012 and later. Fisher, Sheehan & Colton use a calculation for 
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Figure 4: Home Energy Affordability Gap 2011-2016 (in billions) 
 
 
 
(FSC 2017) 
 
 
 Each year, FSC calculates the household energy burden for each state, plus the 
District of Columbia. Table 2 shows Utah’s residential energy burden for years 2012-
2016, for households up to 200% of Federal Poverty Level.4 The table indicates that the 
group energy burden for households between 100% and 200% of Federal Poverty Level 
ranges from 4% and 7%. To calculate the Home Energy Affordability Gap, FSC relied on 
data from the following sources: U.S. Census, American Community Survey, fuel-
                                                      
the Gap in 2011 as the base year to compare 2012 and later HEAG 
calculations against. 
4 FSC use a group energy burden approach. 
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specific information from the Energy Information Administration, federal poverty lines, 
allocations from the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance program, the U.S. 
Department of Energy’s Residential Energy Consumption Survey, weather information 
from the National Weather Service’s Climate Prediction Center, and price information 
from the Petroleum Administration for Defense Districts. 
 
Table 2: Utah Residential Energy Burden 2012-2016 
 
 
 
(FSC 2017) 
 
 
 As mentioned earlier, no uniform definitions for affordable and unaffordable 
household energy burdens exist. FSC, however, uses a threshold for an affordable home 
energy burden of 6% of household income (FSC 2016), and researchers from the Applied 
Public Policy Research Institute for Study and Evaluation (APPRISE) propose 11% of 
income as the threshold for a high energy burden (APPRISE 2007). For Utah residents, 
during 2012-2016, then, those definitions suggest that households at or below Federal 
Poverty Level live with high household energy burdens. 
 FSC’s work on the Home Energy Affordability Gap, which includes calculating 
residential energy burdens, is some of the most extensive work available, and, in the 
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domestic energy poverty literature, perhaps the most widely relied upon. That work, 
along with the calculations of energy burden produced by the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services’ Division of Energy Assistance (addressed in the section on 
LIHEAP), are models for further research on residential energy burdens. 
 
Energy Efficiency 
 
 
 Though total household energy expenditures for low income households were less 
than for non-low-income households (Division of Energy Assistance 2016, p. 24), 
residential energy burden is used to show that low income households pay a higher 
proportion of their household incomes on energy. This measure is used by many groups 
to advocate for aid in helping low income households pay their energy bills. But 
advocating for help paying for energy bills isn’t the only use to which measures of 
household energy burden have been put. Energy burden statistics are also used to 
advocate for programs that increase household energy efficiency. 
 In a report on energy burden for the American Council for an Energy Efficient 
Economy, Ariel Drehobl and Lauren Ross (2016, 3) reached the unremarkable conclusion 
that demographic groups that are associated with low income also have higher energy 
burdens than average households. Their contribution to the energy burden discussion, 
however, is to indicate that while low-income households have lower energy bills in 
absolute terms, they pay relatively more per square foot of housing space than non-low-
income households (Ibid.). Furthermore, Drehobl and Ross (Ibid.) concluded that “for 
low-income households and for multifamily low-income households, bringing housing 
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stock up to the efficiency of the median household would eliminate 35% of excess energy 
burden, reducing energy burden from 7.2% to 5.9%.” 
 The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) operates the Weatherization Assistance 
Program (WAP), which helps low income households increase their homes’ energy 
efficiency. WAP provides services to about 35,000 homes each year, at an average 
weatherization cost of $4,695 per household unit (DOE 2017, 1). DOE indicates that the 
energy burden for low income households is about 16% of annual income (recall that 
APPRISE proposes a threshold of 11% as an indicator of a high energy burden), 
compared to a household energy of 3.5% for other households, and that this difference 
means that low-income households must often “cut back on healthcare, medicine, 
groceries, and childcare to pay their energy bills” (Ibid.). 
DOE funds weatherization services, such as “insulation and air sealing, HVAC 
systems, lighting, and appliances,” credited with an average annual energy cost savings 
of $283 per household (Ibid.). DOE also states that WAP can reduce household heating 
costs in cold weather states by an average of 30%, that the program “returns $2.78 in 
non-energy benefits for every $1” invested in WAP, and that these benefits lower out-of-
pocket medical expenses by an average of $514 per weatherized household (Ibid.). 
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ENERGY IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
 
 In addition to understanding the role government plays in alleviating the burden 
of high energy bills for low-income families, it is important to understand why the need 
for alleviating that burden exists in the first place. Consider again the energy burden 
ratio: energy burden = energy expenditures / income. 
 Most research on energy poverty in the United States focuses on discovering to 
what degree it exists, what it means for low-income households, and how to lighten the 
energy burden of low-income households. That is, the question that most current research 
tries to answer is “Given the price of energy and a low household income, how can 
government alleviate the problem of a high energy burden?” This question looks at the 
inputs—energy prices and household income—and seeks an answer ex post facto that 
fixes the identified problem of high energy burdens. Solutions then come in the form of 
welfare programs like LIHEAP and WAP.  
 Of the two components of the energy burden ratio, the most significant is 
household income. Household energy expenditures do fluctuate from household to 
household, but not so extremely that energy expenditures (the numerator) is the key 
determinant of a household having an affordable or a high energy burden. Unsurprisingly, 
then, a high energy burden goes hand-in-hand with having a low income, and increasing a 
household’s income is the surest way of reducing the household energy burden.  
 The question of how to increase household income is the central problem of the 
high energy burden discussion, and is the same problem discussed since at least Adam 
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Smith’s Wealth of Nations, first published in 1776. That is, what conditions give rise to 
wealth and prosperity, for individuals and for nations? 
 The question of how to increase household income, and alleviate the burden of 
having a low-household income, is broadly discussed and frequently debated. I leave that 
discussion to others, acknowledging that it is the more significant component of 
addressing high household energy burdens. In my research, I instead focus on 
understanding the admittedly smaller and less significant, and therefore less-discussed 
question of the determinants of energy prices. That is, what happens in the market and in 
politics that affects how much people pay for household energy? As mentioned earlier, 
most research takes the energy prices and household income as given, and then works to 
find ways to solve the problem. In this thesis, I’ve attempted to explore the question of 
high energy burden by looking at what affects the price of energy. That is, I attempt to 
approach the problem of energy burden from the foundation of understanding what 
affects the price of energy. Understanding the factors that increase the price of energy 
offers another way for policymakers to address the issue of high energy burdens, and my 
research is meant to help start, and contribute to, that discussion. 
 
The Story of the American Energy Market 
 
 
 Over the course of America’s history, its inhabitants have moved from relying on 
wood as a primary energy source to using coal, petroleum products, nuclear energy, and 
natural gas. Recent technological developments have allowed people to harness energy 
from sunlight, wind, and the ocean’s tides. Of the energy sources currently available, “the 
three major fossil fuels—petroleum, natural gas, and coal, which together provided 87% 
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of total U.S. primary energy over the past decade—have dominated the U.S. fuel mix for 
well over 100 years … [and] the predominance of these three energy sources is likely to 
continue into the future” (EIA 2013). 
 According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), “in all but 14 of the 
years from 1949 to 2007, energy consumption increased over the previous year. Total 
U.S. energy consumption reached its highest level in 2007” (EIA 2017). The recession in 
2009 significantly reduced energy consumption, and “total U.S. energy consumption in 
2016 was about 4% less than consumption in 2007” (EIA 2017). 
 By far, given its abundance, coal has been the largest contributor to electricity 
generation in the United States, with natural gas increasing over the previous decades to 
overtake coal in 2015 (see Figure 5). As Figures 6 and 7 show, the nominal prices of 
electricity and natural gas have risen over time. 
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Figure 5: U.S. Electricity Net Generation 
 
 
 
(EIA 2017) 
 
 
Figure 6: U.S. Average Retail Prices of Electricity 
 
 
 
(EIA 2017) 
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Figure 7: U.S. Average Retail Prices of Natural Gas 
 
 
 
(EIA 2017) 
 
 
 Though Figures 6 and 7, downloaded from EIA’s website, indicate that prices 
have increased over time, looking at the data another way tells a different story. When 
EIA’s data are broken down into state-level data, it appears that high prices in a few 
states (Hawaii, in particular) have caused the average cost of electricity and natural gas to 
increase rather than there being a general increase in cost across all states. After 
analyzing the data at the state-level, and putting the price of energy in constant 2015 
dollars, my analysis shows that the prices of electricity and natural gas have either fallen 
slightly or stayed about the same over the past few decades (see Figures 8 and 9). This 
begs the question, “Why?” 
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Figure 8: State Residential Price of Electricity 
 
  
 
Note that each circle represents a data point for each year, for each state. The outlier is 
Hawaii. 
Amounts are inflation-adjusted and in 2014 dollars. 
Data adapted from EIA’s State Energy Data System (EIA 2017)5. 
  
                                                      
5 EIA’s State Energy Data System (SEDS) provides comprehensive state energy 
statistics. The database is very large, and I stitched together a smaller data set using the 
variables I needed for my research. The dataset I built is available upon request. 
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Figure 9: State Residential Price of Natural Gas 
 
 
  
Note that each circle represents a data point for each year, for each state. The outlier is 
Hawaii. 
Amounts are inflation-adjusted and in 2014 dollars. 
Data adapted from EIA’s State Energy Data System (EIA 2017). 
 
 
What Affects the Price of Energy? 
 
 
 In order to understand the numerator of the energy burden ratio (energy 
expenditures), it is necessary to understand the determinants of the price of energy. In the 
context of residential energy burden, then, it is necessary to understand what affects the 
price of electricity and natural gas, as they “are the most-consumed energy sources in 
U.S. homes” (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2013).  
 According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), the factors affecting 
electricity and natural gas prices include: per unit cost of fuel; power plant construction, 
maintenance, and operating costs; transmission and distribution costs; weather conditions 
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(because extreme temperatures increase demand); type of customer (residential, 
commercial, industrial, or transportation); geographic location; federal and state 
regulations (such as the prices set by Public Service or Public Utility Commissions); and 
variations in the amount of natural gas production, imports and exports, and storage (EIA 
2016 and 2016). 
 In addition to the above-mentioned factors, regulation affecting everything from 
the process of extracting and harnessing energy to the system of delivering that energy to 
consumers will also affect the retail energy prices. The U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) acknowledges that causal chain in its regulatory impact analyses of 
various Clean Air Act-related regulations. In its “Regulatory Impact Analysis for the 
Clean Power Plan Final Rule,” for example, EPA reported the results of its use of the 
Integrated Planning Model to project the impact of the Clean Power Plan, a regulation 
affecting carbon dioxide emissions from power plants (EPA 2015, 3-1). 
 EPA predicts that the Clean Power Plan will affect the price of natural gas and 
coal, but because those fuel sources are “important inputs to the production of other 
goods and services,” this increase in price will also lead to “changes in the quantities 
and/or prices of the goods or services produced” elsewhere (Ibid., 5-3). That is, 
regulation affects the price of fuel sources needed to generate electricity and other inputs 
used to support other goods and services demanded by consumers. Regulation, therefore, 
is like the proverbial stone tossed into a pond—it ripples through the whole system and 
has anticipated and unanticipated consequences. 
 Though there is much to study on the topic of the determinants of energy prices, 
and of electricity and natural gas in particular, my immediate interest is in EPA’s analysis 
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of the impact of its regulation on the economy. I am interested in understanding how 
energy and environmental regulations affect the prices of the electricity and natural gas 
people use in their homes. Furthermore, I’m interested in extending that understanding to 
the effect of higher energy prices on residential energy burdens. If, as EPA claims, 
regulation increases the costs of the basic energy inputs of the economy, then 
understanding what the resulting higher prices mean for low-income households is an 
important element of the discussion of poverty in general and energy burden in particular. 
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REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
 
 The economic growth experienced since the Industrial Revolution vaulted 
millions of people out of poverty and raised their standards of living. But the increase in 
quality of life has not been free of consequences. Concern for the pollution generated by 
such economic growth has propelled people to pursue solutions through government 
action.  
 Yet the push to regulate the energy sources that have revolutionized the economy 
has not been free of consequences either. From a global perspective, seeking to limit 
carbon dioxide producing energy sources, like coal, means that millions (if not billions) 
of people are being held back from more comfortable lifestyles because they lack access 
to cheap and reliable energy. From a U.S. perspective, regulating energy sources like coal 
and natural gas, and therefore increasing the price of basic inputs to the economy, raises 
the cost of living for all. When this happens, it isn’t the wealthy who bear the heaviest 
burden of the regulation, but rather those who lack the financial resources to insulate 
them from the shock of higher prices. 
 A relevant study is by Terry Dinan and Diane Lim Rogers, in the June 2002 issue 
of the National Tax Journal. They modeled the distributional effects of a proposed cap on 
U.S. carbon-dioxide emissions. In their analysis, they stated that “carbon-intensive 
consumption—defined here as expenditures on electricity, natural gas, fuel oil and coal, 
and gasoline and oil—makes up larger fractions of the total expenditures of lower-income 
households” (210). Thus, a policy limiting carbon emissions may have a regressive 
effect, and low-income households would bear the heaviest burden of complying with the 
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policy unless the “government sought to offset the regressivity of the policy-induced 
price increases by providing lump-sum rebates” (Ibid., 219). As it relates to my research, 
this conclusion suggests a positive relationship between more regulation and more energy 
poverty, unless actions are taken to moderate the burden on low-income households. 
 Inasmuch as energy and environmental regulation aims to internalize the external 
cost of pollution, regulation is a roundabout way to tax energy production without 
actually calling the intervention a tax. Thus, the literature on the effects of a carbon 
dioxide tax is relevant to my research. 
 Andrea Baranzini, Jose Goldemberg, and Stefan Speck, in their 2000 paper 
published in Ecological Economics, summarized the results of several studies showing 
that “carbon taxes are generally regressive, but less than first expected” (404). They 
concluded that “the distributional impacts of carbon tax are quite complicated, since they 
depend on at least four factors:” household expenditure patterns, the degree to which the 
burden of the tax is passed on from producers to consumers, the distribution of benefits 
resulting from improved environmental quality, and how revenues generated from the tax 
are used to reduce the regressive impact of the tax (Ibid., 404). Inasmuch as regulation 
can be considered a method of taxation, this research indicates that I should expect to see 
that regulation is regressive, meaning that more regulation has a positive correlation with 
higher energy burdens, but that the relationship may be weaker than I would expect at 
first, given the four considerations mentioned. 
 Gbadebo Oladosu and Adam Rose, in a study published May 2007 in Energy 
Economics, examined the distributional impacts of a proposed carbon tax in the 
Susquehanna River Basin and concluded that the tax would be mildly progressive, in 
  
33 
contrast to most of the literature suggesting that a carbon tax is mildly regressive. They 
state that their study indicates that, despite the progressivity of the carbon tax, “lower 
income groups [will] spend relatively more of their income on Food, Housing, and Health 
Services than prior to the imposition of the tax,” (536) and conclude by refraining from 
the suggestion that the study’s finding of carbon tax progressivity is generalizable to “all 
other regions” (Ibid., 538).  
 Two working papers, “Regressive Effects of Regulation” by Diana Thomas and 
“How Do Federal Regulations Affect Consumer Prices?” by Dustin Chambers and 
Courtney Collins, informed my early research of the regressive effects of regulation. 
Specifically, Chambers and Collins found that “a 10 percent increase in total regulations 
leads to a 0.687 percent increase in consumer prices (Chambers and Collins 2016, 4); 
Thomas concluded that “regulation reflects the preferences of high-income households 
and effectively redistributes wealth from the poor to the middle class and the rich” 
(Thomas 2012, abstract). Together, these papers assert that regulation tends to reflect the 
preferences of middle- and higher-income households, but that the burden of regulation 
tends to fall disproportionately on lower-income households. 
 The findings by Thomas, Chambers, and Collins indicate support for the public 
choice school of thought: people are people, whether they are making a choice in the 
marketplace or in the voting booth. Rather than voting in “the public interest,” self-
interested human beings vote and act to promote their own well-being in the political 
environment. Though individuals may not implement policy with the express purpose of 
harming lower income groups, their personal preferences result in policies that benefit 
themselves at the expense of others. Those groups that can mobilize and exert influence 
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on the political system are able to take advantage of groups that are not able to do so, and 
low-income households appear to be the ones bearing the brunt of the policy preferences 
of wealthier households. 
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THE PRICE-REGULATION PUZZLE 
 
 
 As mentioned earlier, the prices of electricity and natural gas general decline or 
stay constant over time (see Figures 8 and 9). Data from the Mercatus Center, however, 
shows that regulation over the past several decades has grown markedly, and Figures 10 
and 11 show the rise in regulation since 1980. Figure 10 shows the growth in regulatory 
restrictions overall, and Figure 11 shows the growth in energy and environmental 
regulatory restrictions.  
 
Figure 10: Regulatory Restriction Count 
 
 
 
(Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin 2017) 
  
  
36 
Figure 11: Energy and Environmental Regulatory Restriction Count 
 
 
 
(Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin 2017) 
 
 Following the Mercatus Center’s definition, the regulatory restriction count is the 
number of words like “shall” and “must” that indicate a requirement to comply. The 
creators of the Mercatus Center’s regulation database write that counting the restrictions, 
rather than overall word or page counts, is a more accurate indicator of the regulatory 
burden “because some regulatory programs can be hundreds of pages long with relatively 
few restrictions, while others only have a few paragraphs with a relatively high number 
of restrictions” (Al-Ubaydli & McLaughlin 2017). 
 Because I am interested specifically in energy and environmental regulation, not 
just overall regulation, I used Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin’s classification of the 
regulation data in order to count the number of energy and environmental regulatory 
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restrictions since 1980 (as mentioned, shown in Figure 11). The same trend applies as 
with regulation in general: a significant increase since 1980. 
 As Figures 8, 9, 10, and 11 indicate, the idea that regulation increases the price of 
energy seems to not have been borne out as theory anticipated. Regulation is rising, while 
inflation-adjusted energy prices either remain constant or are falling. What explains this 
surprising observation? 
 There is, of course, the tempting correlation-causation answer: contrary to 
expectation, regulation reduces energy prices. But the correlation between regulatory 
growth and declining or constant energy prices does not indicate causation—at least not 
without further exploration. 
 
Questions and Hypotheses 
 
 
 As mentioned earlier, the price of energy is affected by many factors. Because I 
am interested in the relationship between regulation and residential energy burden, and 
the relationship between energy and environmental regulation and residential energy 
burden, in particular, I must break my research question down into smaller components. 
In order to explore how regulation affects the residential energy burden, I must ask: 
1) How does regulation, and energy and environmental regulation, in particular, 
affect the prices of electricity and natural gas?6 
2) How does regulation and the prices of electricity and natural gas affect the 
household residential energy burden? 
                                                      
6 Though energy sources other than electricity and natural gas are used to provide energy 
to households, electricity and natural gas are the two largest sources used in households. 
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 Given my expectations after reading the literature, and despite my initial finding 
that increasing regulation does not seem to have led to higher energy prices, my 
directional hypothesis is that an increase in regulation, and an increase in energy and 
environmental regulation in particular, raises the prices of electricity and natural gas, 
which in turn raise the residential energy burden. 
 My non-directional hypothesis is than an increase in regulation, and an increase in 
energy and environmental regulation in particular, affects the prices of electricity and 
natural gas, which in turn affects the residential energy burden. 
 In order to account for the possibility of no relationship, my null hypothesis is that 
no causal relationship exists between an increase in regulation, of any kind, and the prices 
of electricity and natural gas. In other words, an increase in regulation has no second-
order effect on the residential energy burden. 
 
Testing the Correlations 
 
 
 As presented earlier, Figure 8 shows the inflation-adjusted price of residential 
electricity and Figure 9 shows the inflation-adjusted price of residential natural gas. As 
Figures 8 and 9 also show, the prices of electricity and natural gas fluctuated over the 
past several decades, but not wildly so. Figure 12 shows the historical residential energy 
burden at the state level, and the figure also shows that from 1980 to 1995, the residential 
energy burden declined from about 3.5 percent to 2 percent, leveling off thereafter. 
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 Figure 12: State Residential Energy Burden 
 
 
 
Note that each circle represents a data point for each year, for each state. 
Amounts are inflation-adjusted and in 2014 dollars. 
Data adapted from EIA’s State Energy Data System (EIA 2017). 
 
 
 In contrast to the relatively stable historical prices of residential electricity and 
natural gas, and the general reduction in the state residential energy burden, Figures 10 
and 11 show the steady increase of regulatory restrictions since 1980. As mentioned 
earlier, the term “regulatory restrictions” counts words like “must” and “shall” in 
regulations published in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, which indicate mandatory 
constraints on industry and which we can therefore expect to result in some sort of 
compliance cost. Figure 10 shows the increase in all regulatory restrictions in the Code of 
Federal Regulations and Figure 11 shows the increase in regulatory restrictions that relate 
to energy and environmental regulation, using the two-digit North American Industry 
Classification System (NAICS) adopted by federal agencies when working with 
  
40 
statistical data as a means of identifying regulations falling into the energy and 
environmental regulation category. 
Comparing Figures 8 and 9 to Figures 10 and 11 calls into question the validity of 
my hypothesis that more regulation, and, in particular, more energy and environmental 
regulation, leads to higher electricity and natural gas prices and therefore raises the 
household residential energy burden. Table 3 shows the correlations between regulation 
and electricity prices, natural gas prices, and state residential energy burdens. 
 
Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
 
 2 Digit NAICS: Energy & 
Environmental Regulatory 
Restrictions 
All Regulatory Restrictions 
Price of Electricity -0.02 -0.02 
Price of Natural Gas -0.005 0.05 
State Residential Energy 
Burden 
-0.60 -0.58 
 
 The correlations shown in Table 3 indicate a negative and weak relationship 
between the prices of electricity and natural gas and the number of regulatory restrictions 
(both energy and environmental restrictions and total restrictions), with a positive and 
weak relationship between the number of total regulatory restrictions and the price of 
natural gas. 
 Though my hypothesis, based on the literature summarized earlier, indicates that I 
should expect to see positive correlations, the relationship shown in Table 3 is the 
opposite of what I expected, with the exception of the correlation between all regulatory 
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restrictions and the price of natural gas, which is positive, but very weak. Controlling for 
other factors, then, is important for illuminating this puzzle. 
 
Modeling Regulation and Energy Prices 
 
 
 Appendix A, which includes Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7, shows the results of my attempt 
at an empirical test of my research question. Though I do find, in some instances, 
evidence that an increase in regulation does affect the residential energy burden, I can 
conclude only that there is no evidence is found that more regulation has a direct and 
strong effect on the residential energy burden in either direction.  
 My first attempt at an empirical analysis of my research question indicates more 
work must be done in order to understand what is going on. Despite theory, and 
pronouncements from regulators themselves (such as EPA), more regulation does not 
have the clear effect on residential energy burden that I expected it to have. In order to 
further understand this puzzle, it will be necessary to specify several additional models to 
study this puzzle, including supply- and demand-side models explaining the variations in 
energy prices over time.  
 Though I leave further research to others, I suggest such a model be built by 
expanding the models I used for my empirical analysis (and which are described in 
Appendix A). I used a two-part model, which reflected the two parts of my research 
question: 
1) How does regulation, and energy and environmental regulation in particular, 
affect the prices of electricity and natural gas? 
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2) How does regulation and the prices of electricity and natural gas affect the 
household residential energy burden? 
 To answer question one, it will be necessary to run separate regressions on 
electricity price and natural gas price, with the price of energy on the left-hand side and 
the factors affecting the price of energy, such as regulation, weather, and other economic 
factors, on the right-hand side. Example models, using the price of electricity and the 
price of natural gas as the left-hand side variables, are as follows: 
Electricity Price    =  β0  
+ β1 Energy & Environmental Regulatory Restrictions  
+ β2 All Other Regulatory Restrictions 
+ β3 Presence of EPA’s Mercury & Air Toxics Standards        
Rule (dummy)7 
+ β4 Presence of EPA’s Clean Air Interstate Rule (dummy) 
+ β5 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water Intake Structures  
Rule, Phase 1 (dummy) 
+ β6 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water Intake Structures  
Rule, Phase 2 (dummy) 
+ β7 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water Intake Structures  
                                                      
7 Specific regulations, such EPA’s Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, 
could be added to the regression in order to determine whether specific 
regulations, rather than regulation in general, have greater and statistically 
significant effects on the prices of energy. If individual regulations were 
added, it is important to note that they would be double-counted—both as 
a regulatory restriction and as a dummy variable for the years the 
regulation is in effect. 
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Rule, Phase 3 (dummy) 
+ β8 Presence of a State RPS (dummy) 
+ β9 Presence of a National Recession (dummy) 
+ β10 Weather variable (perhaps number of heating or  
cooling days) 
Natural Gas Price    =  β0  
+ β1 Energy & Environmental Regulatory Restrictions  
+ β2 All Other Regulatory Restrictions 
+ β3 Presence of EPA’s Mercury & Air Toxics Standards   
       Rule (dummy) 
+ β4 Presence of EPA’s Clean Air Interstate Rule (dummy) 
+ β5 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water Intake Structures  
Rule, Phase 1 (dummy) 
+ β6 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water Intake Structures  
Rule, Phase 2 (dummy) 
+ β7 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water Intake Structures  
Rule, Phase 3 (dummy) 
+ β8 Presence of a State RPS (dummy) 
+ β9 Presence of a National Recession (dummy) 
+ β10 Weather variable (perhaps number of heating or  
cooling days) 
 The results of these first regressions would then inform the results of the second-
stage regression, which will look something like: 
  
44 
 
Residential Energy Burden = β0  
+ β1 Environmental Regulatory Restrictions  
+ β2 All Other Regulatory Restrictions 
+ β3 Presence of EPA’s Mercury & Air Toxics Standards   
       Rule (dummy) 
+ β4 Presence of EPA’s Clean Air Interstate Rule (dummy) 
+ β5 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water Intake Structures  
Rule, Phase 1 (dummy) 
+ β6 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water Intake Structures  
Rule, Phase 2 (dummy) 
+ β7 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water Intake Structures  
Rule, Phase 3 (dummy) 
+ β8 Presence of a State RPS (dummy) 
+ β9 Presence of a National Recession (dummy) 
+ β10 State Poverty Rate 
+ β11 Price of Residential Electricity (cents/kWh) 
+ β12 Price of Residential Natural Gas (dollars/thousand  
cubic feet) 
 As I discuss in Appendix A, one of the problems I ran into is a lack of data at the 
household level, meaning that I was not able to get a sample of individual household 
energy consumption and income data. Instead, I gathered aggregated household energy 
consumption and income data—recall this is the method described in the group approach 
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to studying energy burden. Though this method was useful in describing the group energy 
burden in each state and for the nation, it had limited value because much of the variation 
in energy burden was lost in the state and national averages. Thus, such an approach did 
not allow me to see whether the energy burden was or was not increasing on the margin. 
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ANALYSIS 
 
 
 As mentioned earlier, a glance at Figures 8 and 9 shows that inflation-adjusted 
electricity and natural gas prices have remained fairly constant over time, even as 
regulation has been increasing almost exponentially. Furthermore, the correlations and 
the results of my first-attempt at an empirical test of my research question do not indicate 
support for the idea that regulation increases energy prices or, in turn, affects the 
residential energy burden.  
 Acknowledging that the answer to my research question may simply be that there 
is no relationship between regulation and energy prices or residential energy burden, I 
expect that if theory is in fact correct, supply- and demand-side factors that explain why 
there appears to be no relationship when a relationship may actually exist. I suspect that 
the explanation for my findings of no relationship lie in understanding how the demand 
for and supply of energy has circumvented or mitigated the effect of increasing 
regulation.  
 
Competition-Driven Innovation 
 
 
 Competition spurs innovation. As an example, consider OPEC’s price war on 
American hydraulic fracturing. When OPEC agreed to drive down oil prices in an effort 
to strangle American fracking, entrepreneurs responded with innovation that made 
fracking more cost-effective, allowing American fracking to compete even more strongly 
with OPEC. OPEC’s effort to strangle American fracking through a price war backfired. 
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 Taking the theory that regulation is burdensome and therefore that more 
regulation would increase the cost of providing a good or service, competition similar to 
the OPEC-American fracking conflict could offset the burden of regulation to the degree 
that it appears as though regulation had no effect on costs or prices. Such may be the case 
with American residential energy expenditures. 
 As shown in Figure 13, inflation-adjusted residential energy expenditures have 
remained fairly constant since 1980. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
indicates, however, that “energy use for air conditioning has doubled since 1980,” that 
households “plug in more appliances and electronics at home than ever before,” and that 
“ownership of appliances such as microwaves, dishwashers, and clothes washers and 
dryers has increased over the past 30 years” (2013). Thus, despite technological 
innovation over the past almost-four decades, the proliferation of energy-using devices 
has not resulted in a corresponding increase in energy expenditures. 
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Figure 13: State Residential Energy Expenditures, 1980-2014 
 
 
Note that each circle represents a data point for each year, for each state. The outlier is 
Hawaii. 
Amounts are inflation-adjusted and in 2014 dollars. 
Data adapted from EIA’s State Energy Data System (EIA 2017). 
 
 
It is likely that energy efficiency is increasing as entrepreneurs improve the 
devices that have now become a part of daily living. Thus, although the total number of 
energy-consuming devices has grown over time, the ability to provide electricity for 
those devices and improve those devices to be more energy efficient likely has offset the 
otherwise expected increase in energy expenditures. EIA (2012) supports the accuracy of 
such reasoning to be accurate, stating that the results of the 2009 Residential Energy 
Consumption Survey indicate that “despite increases in the number and the average size 
of homes plus increased use of electronics, improvements in efficiency for space heating, 
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air conditioning, and major appliances have all led to decreased consumption per 
household.”8 
It is also possible that energy prices have actually have risen significantly, but that 
the price of energy is obscured by how the electricity is paid for. That is, if the price of 
energy is subsidized in any manner, the amount households pay for energy, as reflected 
on their energy bills, may not reflect how much that energy actually costs.9 
 
Regulation-Driven Innovation 
 
 
 Few things are as regulated as much as energy is, and yet the prices of energy do 
not appear to be as heavily impacted by regulation as theory would predict.  To the 
contrary, it appears as though more regulation is commensurate with increasing 
innovation in the energy market. It may be that regulation, in a manner similar to OPEC’s 
intention to strangle American fracking through a price war, is a catalyst for forcing 
innovation.10 Such would be the case with the regulatory War on Coal, which may have 
helped spur the development of technology that contributed to the now-apparent 
substitution of natural gas for coal as the largest source of electricity generation in the 
United States. 
                                                      
8 Note that some of the energy efficiency improvements are due to 
regulations requiring increased efficiency. See the summary conclusion of 
EIA’s February 2015 study, “Drivers of U.S. Household Energy 
Consumption, 1980-2009” (2015). 
9 Such costs are explored in the research done by Institute of Political 
Economy at Utah State University in the Unseen Costs of Electricity 
series. 
10 Particular thanks to one of my thesis committee members, Chris 
Fawson, for this insight. 
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 This is likely due to the high demand for energy. As technology is increasingly 
available to more and more people, and as more and more households obtain energy-
consuming devices, the demand for energy increases. It may be that regulation meant to 
metaphorically plug a hole in a leaking dam causes innovators to find new ways to get 
around the dam, to the effect that technological development swamps the burdensome 
effect of regulation.11  
  
                                                      
11 In the literature on the effects of regulation on the economy, this 
proposition may appear heretical, but it is worth considering. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 As mentioned earlier, the surprising finding of my research is that an increase in 
regulation does not have the direct effect on electricity prices or on residential energy 
burden that I expected it to have. This finding does not mean that theory is wrong and 
that the relationship does not exist, but rather that further research is needed to determine 
whether theory is borne out in reality. 
 My research resulted in some additional surprising findings. The first indicates 
that federal subsidies for low-income housing may distort the housing market so that, on 
the margin, families that are unprepared to shoulder the cost of living on their own are 
incentivized to do so, and then become trapped in a cycle of poverty because they 
struggle to pay for their energy bills and end up living with a high energy burden.  
 The second additional finding is that, in at least some instances, regulation may 
spur innovation. The fairly constant prices of electricity and declining natural gas prices, 
despite increasing regulation and an increase in the number of devices using energy, 
indicate that something is happening to keep the price of energy stable when the demand 
for it is rising. Whether that is a result of competition-driven innovation, a result of 
regulation-driven innovation, or a combination of the two and some other factors, is yet 
to be determined.  
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Appendix A: Sample Models & Results 
 
 
Modeling Regulation and State Energy Burden 
 
 To explore the puzzle of relatively constant energy prices and increasing 
regulation, I used the group energy burden approach to create a variable for state 
residential energy burdens. This variable does not allow me to explore how regulations 
affect the energy burden of households in different income groups, but does allow me to 
understand how regulations affect the residential energy burden at the state level 
aggregation. As a reminder, state energy burden = state residential energy expenditures / 
state aggregated personal income. 
 
The Model 
 
 My research question has two parts:  
1) How does regulation, and energy and environmental regulation in particular, 
affect the prices of electricity and natural gas? 
2) Given the answers to my first question, how does regulation affect the state 
residential energy burden? 
In order to understand the relationship between regulation and the prices of electricity 
and natural gas, and the relationship between regulation and the state residential energy 
burden, I controlled for additional variables that I believe affect the dependent variables. 
In addition to creating two variables for regulation—energy and environmental regulatory 
restrictions and all other regulatory restrictions—I added dummy variables indicating if 
and when a state instituted a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), when the nation was 
in recession, and the presence of three EPA regulations: the Mercury and Air Toxics 
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Standards rule, the Clean Air Interstate Rule, and phases 1-3 of the Cooling Water Intake 
Structures rule. 
 In part one of this two-stage regression, I estimated the following: 
Electricity Price    =  β0  
+ β1 Energy & Environmental Regulatory Restrictions  
+ β2 All Other Regulatory Restrictions 
+ β3 Presence of EPA’s Mercury & Air Toxics Standards        
Rule (dummy) 
+ β4 Presence of EPA’s Clean Air Interstate Rule (dummy) 
+ β5 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water Intake Structures  
Rule, Phase 1 (dummy) 
+ β6 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water Intake Structures  
Rule, Phase 2 (dummy) 
+ β7 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water Intake Structures  
Rule, Phase 3 (dummy) 
+ β8 Presence of a State RPS (dummy) 
+ β9 Presence of a National Recession (dummy) 
+ β10 Weather variable (perhaps number of heating or  
cooling days) 
Natural Gas Price    =  β0  
+ β1 Energy & Environmental Regulatory Restrictions  
+ β2 All Other Regulatory Restrictions 
+ β3 Presence of EPA’s Mercury & Air Toxics Standards   
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       Rule (dummy) 
+ β4 Presence of EPA’s Clean Air Interstate Rule (dummy) 
+ β5 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water Intake Structures  
Rule, Phase 1 (dummy) 
+ β6 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water Intake Structures  
Rule, Phase 2 (dummy) 
+ β7 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water Intake Structures  
Rule, Phase 3 (dummy) 
+ β8 Presence of a State RPS (dummy) 
+ β9 Presence of a National Recession (dummy) 
+ β10 Weather variable (perhaps number of heating or  
cooling days) 
In step two of this regression analysis, I moved the electricity price and natural 
gas price variables to the right-hand side of the equation and used the state residential 
energy burden as the dependent variable: 
State Residential Energy Burden   =  β0 
+ β1 Environmental Regulatory Restrictions  
+ β2 All Other Regulatory Restrictions 
+ β3 Presence of EPA’s Mercury & Air  
Toxics Standards Rule (dummy) 
+ β4 Presence of EPA’s Clean Air Interstate  
Rule (dummy) 
+ β5 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water  
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Intake Structures Rule, Phase 1  
(dummy) 
+ β6 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water  
Intake Structures Rule, Phase 2 
(dummy) 
+ β7 Presence of EPA’s Cooling Water  
Intake Structures Rule, Phase 3  
(dummy) 
+ β8 Presence of a State RPS (dummy) 
+ β9 Presence of a National Recession  
(dummy) 
+ β10 State Poverty Rate 
+ β11 Price of Residential Electricity  
(cents/kWh) 
+ β12 Price of Residential Natural Gas  
(dollars/thousand cubic feet) 
Description of Variables and Summary Statistics 
State Residential Energy Burden 
 
 As described earlier, the State Residential Energy Burden is equal to state 
residential energy expenditures divided by state aggregated personal income, where the 
state residential energy expenditure data are taken from the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration’s State Energy Data System (2017) and the state aggregated personal 
income data are from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (n.d.).  
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 The mean level of residential energy expenditures relative to income is two 
percent, with a standard deviation of one percent, and a minimum and maximum energy 
burden of one percent and five percent, respectively. Remember that the measure of an 
affordable residential energy bill I have chosen to use is six percent of income. This 
measure shows that, as a group, residents in each state have affordable energy bills. What 
this measure does not reveal, however, is how many households in each state pay more 
than an affordable measure of six percent of income. Thus, this variable is helpful in the 
energy poverty discussion, but does not provide a complete picture of the residential 
energy needs of those who are in energy poverty. See Table 4 for summary statistics. 
Regulation 
 Omar Al-Ubaydli and Patrick McLaughlin, researchers from the Mercatus Center 
at George Mason University, developed a database called RegData (Al-Ubaydli and 
McLaughlin 2015) in order to improve the “measurement of regulations and the 
regulatory process” (Mercatus 2017). RegData measures the federal regulatory burden in 
two ways: (1) by word counts, and (2) by the number of explicit restrictions, which count 
the number of words in a regulation like “must” and “shall” that indicate a binding 
constraint on activity. Because a regulation can be wordy but not be particularly 
restrictive, I use the regulatory restriction data from RegData to measure the burden of 
regulation over time. 
 Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin categorize regulation in two ways: (1) by agency, 
and (2) by the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). NAICS is used 
by federal statistical agencies when “classifying business establishments for the purpose 
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of collecting, analyzing, and publishing statistical data related to the U.S. business 
economy” (U.S. Census 2017). 
 RegData uses the North American Industry Classification System to categorize 
the industries that a particular regulation is likely to affect. I created two variables for 
regulation using RegData: (1) regulatory restrictions relating to NAICS codes 21 
(Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction) and 22 (Utilities), and (2) all other 
regulatory restrictions. This was the most convenient method of classifying regulation as 
either falling into an “energy and environmental regulation” category or an “other 
regulation” category. 
 Because the regulatory restriction data I have is for federal regulation, and which I 
have therefore applied equally across each state, the mean and standard deviation 
summary statistics are not useful. Since 1980, the minimum number of regulatory 
restrictions was 28,327 for energy and environmental regulation and 416,558 for all other 
regulations. The maximum number of regulatory restrictions was 93,160 for energy and 
environmental regulation and 781,882 for all other regulations. See Table 4 for summary 
statistics. 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
Specific Regulations 
 Even though I created variables to measure the burden of regulation using the 
regulatory restrictions count from the Mercatus Center’s RegData, I was interested in 
seeing how particular regulations affected the dependent variables. I created dummy 
variables for the following regulations issued by the Environmental Protection Agency: 
the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards rule, the Clean Air Interstate Rule, and phases one 
through three of the Cooling Water Intake Structures rule. 
 In addition to the three regulations issued by EPA, it was important to account for 
regulations at the state level. As there is not currently a RegData-like database for 
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regulations at the state level, I created a dummy variable for states that have a renewable 
portfolio standard (RPS) and turned the dummy variable on in the year that the RPS was 
implemented. 
 The summary statistics for these variables, presented above in Table 4, are not 
particularly useful, other than to note that my data set includes several decades of data 
before any of these regulations are implemented. With respect to RPS, over half of the 
states have had an RPS at some time, although not all states that previously had an RPS 
currently have one. States that have a non-mandatory RPS are not included as having an 
RPS. 
National Recession 
 Because of the significance of the Great Recession, it seemed prudent to account 
for the effects of a recession on the residential energy burden. Recall that the energy 
burden is a ratio of energy expenditures to income. If energy expenditures remain 
constant, or fell only slightly, but income drops significantly, then the residential energy 
burden will increase significantly. This change in energy burden would, of course, not be 
a result of energy and environmental regulations but instead a loss of income. I used data 
from the National Bureau of Economic Research (2017). 
 Though the summary statistics for this variable are presented above in Table 4, 
they are not particularly useful. From 1980 to 2014, the United States had four 
recessions, the most significant of which was of course the Great Recession which began 
in 2008. 
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Poverty Rate 
 Though I used the national recession dummy variable to account for changes in 
income during a national recession, it is also important to account for the variation in 
economic activity that occurs within each state. For this, I chose to use the state poverty 
rate. When this variable is entered on the right-hand side of the equation for which the 
state residential energy burden is the dependent variable, it would make sense for this 
variable to have a positive and significant relationship with the state residential energy 
burden. If energy expenditures don’t change commensurately with a decline in income, 
then an increase in the poverty rate would result in an increase in the residential energy 
burden, and therefore an increase in the number of people living in energy poverty. I used 
data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (n.d.). 
 The mean poverty rate in the United States from 1980 to 2014 was 13 percent, 
with a standard deviation of four percent. The minimum poverty rate was three percent, 
for New Hampshire in 1986, and the maximum poverty rate of 27 percent occurred in 
Mississippi during 1988. See Table 4 (above) for summary statistics. 
Prices of Electricity and Natural Gas 
 These two variables are both a dependent and an independent variable. In part one 
of my two-stage regression, I use both of these as dependent variables in order to 
understand the relationship between regulatory restrictions and the price of electricity and 
natural gas. In part two, I use these as independent variables in order to see how the 
relationship between regulatory restrictions and the prices of electricity and natural gas 
may carry through to the residential energy burden. Electricity price is measured in cents 
per kilowatt-hour and the price of natural gas is measured in dollars per thousand cubic 
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feet. Data comes from the U.S. Energy Information System’s State Energy Data System 
(2017). 
 As Figures 8 and 9 show, the residential prices of electricity and natural gas have 
been fairly constant since 1990, for electricity, and 1980, for natural gas. As Table 4 
shows, the mean price of electricity was 12.5 cents/kWh, and the minimum and 
maximum prices were 7.03 and 38.46 cents/kWh, respectively. The mean price of natural 
gas was $12.66/thousand cubic feet, and the minimum and maximum prices were $4.39 
and $58.04/thousand cubic feet, respectively. 
 
Regulation and the Price of Electricity 
 Table 5 shows the results of the regression on electricity price outlined above. 
  
  
68 
Table 5: Electricity Price as the Dependent Variable 
 
 
 
 The first regression is a pooled OLS model. In order to have consistent estimators 
in this model, however, any unobserved state effect must be uncorrelated with the 
regression explanatory variables (Wooldridge 2012, 460). If this is not true, the model 
will have “bias caused from omitting a time-constant variable” (Ibid.). Wooldridge also 
notes, however, that it can be helpful to estimate the model using pooled OLS, fixed 
effects, and random effects in order to “determine the nature of the biases caused by 
leaving the unobserved effect … entirely in the error term (as does pooled OLS) or 
partially in the error term (as does the RE transformation)” (Ibid., 494). Thus, I’ve used 
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all three approaches Wooldridge mentions, plus the between effects approach, to analyze 
the data. 
 It is difficult to assert that any unobserved state effect is uncorrelated with the 
explanatory regression variables, especially in the case of whether a state has a renewable 
portfolio standard. Thus, it seems best to rely on the fixed, between, and random 
regression models to understand the effect of regulation on electricity price. 
 I use the fixed effects model to remove the unobserved state effects and get 
insight into the effect of an explanatory variable when that variable changes within a U.S. 
state (Gould n.d.). When the unobserved effects are removed, the fixed effects model 
uses a pooled OLS approach on “the time variation … within each cross-sectional 
observation” (Wooldridge 2012, 485). As long as the explanatory variables are strictly 
exogenous, “the fixed effects estimator is unbiased” and the error term “should be 
uncorrelated with each explanatory variable across all time periods” (Ibid., 485). 
 Figure 5 shows the results of using the fixed effects model when electricity price 
is the dependent variable. In this model, the explanatory variables that have a significant 
relationship to the price of electricity are: energy and environmental regulatory 
restrictions (0.01 significance), all other regulatory restrictions (0.001 significance), 
EPA’s Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (MATS) rule (0.01 significance), EPA’s Clean 
Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) (0.01 significance), phase three of EPA’s Cooling Water 
Intake Structures (CWIS) rule (0.01 significance), a state renewable portfolio standard 
(RPS) (0.001 significance), and a national recession (0.05 significance).  
 In each instance that a variable is statistically significant at the 95 percent 
confidence level or higher, the relationship is positive. This indicates that, after removing 
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the unobserved state effects, as regulation increases in a state, we can expect that the 
price of electricity will increase as well. The two-digit North American Industry 
Classification System code regulatory restrictions have a significant and positive, but 
very small association with an increase in the price of electricity (so small to be almost 
zero).  
 Specific regulations, however, rather than a count of all energy and environmental 
regulatory restrictions or all other regulatory restrictions, matter more than a count of 
regulatory restrictions. The implementation of MATS is associated with an increase in 
the price of electricity of 1.39¢/kWh, the implementation of CAIR with an increase in the 
price of electricity of 0.73¢/kWh, the implementation of phase three of CWIS with an 
increase in the price of electricity of 1.36¢/kWh, and the implementation of a state RPS 
with an increase in the price of electricity of 0.52¢/kWh. 
 The between estimation allows me to obtain OLS estimators “on the cross-
sectional equation[s]” (Wooldridge 2012, 485) and provides insight into the effect of an 
explanatory variable when that variable changes between states (Gould n.d.). Wooldridge 
cautions, however, that though between estimation provides insight into the cross-
sectional variation, it “ignores important information on how the variables change over 
time” and will be biased when the unobserved state effects are correlated with the 
explanatory variables (2012, 485). Still, the between effects results shown in Table 5 
indicate that states with an RPS have associated electricity prices that are 6.02¢/kWh 
higher than states without an RPS. Though the between estimation may be biased, the 
direction and magnitude of the result suggest that state energy and environmental policies 
are a significant component of electricity price. 
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 If I assume that the unobserved state effects are “uncorrelated with each 
explanatory variable in all time periods,” (Ibid., 492) then I can use the results of the 
random effects estimation included in Table 5. Wooldridge notes that random effects 
estimation has an advantage over the fixed effects approach because it “assumes that the 
unobserved effect is uncorrelated with all explanatory variables, whether the explanatory 
variables are fixed over time or not” (Ibid., 493).  
 In the random effects estimation, the energy and environmental regulatory 
restrictions variable and the all other regulatory restrictions variable are significant at 
0.01 and 0.001, respectively, and are positive but so small as to almost be zero. As with 
the fixed effects estimation, it appears that the implementation of specific regulations 
matter more than the total regulatory burden: MATS is associated with an increase in the 
price of electricity of 1.4¢/kWh, CAIR with an increase of 0.73¢/kWh, phase three of the 
Cooling Water Intake Structures rule with an increase of 1.36¢/kWh, and a state RPS 
with an increase of 0.56¢/kWh. 
 The story most consistent with the observations from the regressions in Table 5 is 
that an increase in regulations is associated with an increase in the price of electricity, but 
that some regulations matter more than others.  
 
Regulation and the Price of Natural Gas 
 
Table 6 shows the results of the regression on natural gas price outlined above. 
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Table 6: Natural Gas Price as the Dependent Variable 
 
 
  
 The analysis of the effect of regulation on the price of electricity generally carry 
over to the effect of regulation on the price of natural gas, but with some important 
differences. As Table 6 shows, a pooled OLS estimation approach indicates that total 
regulatory restrictions, either in the energy and environmental category or the all other 
category, don’t have a significant relationship to the price of natural gas.  
 The implementation of MATS, however, has a significant and negative 
relationship to the price of natural gas: -$1.74/thousand cubic feet. This is likely 
explained by two factors: (1) MATS and other EPA regulation that made coal more 
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expensive facilitated demand for natural gas, and (2) the development of fracking 
technology that greatly increased the accessible supply of natural gas. 
 The fixed and random effects estimations are very similar and so I discuss them 
concurrently. Energy and environmental regulatory restrictions are significant at 0.001 
and have a very small and negative association with the price of natural gas. This is 
likely, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, a result of regulation that targeted coal, 
and therefore facilitated demand for natural gas, and the exogenous influence of the 
increase in natural gas supply due to the fracking boom.  
 CAIR and phases one through three of the CWIS rule have significant and 
positive associations with the price of natural gas, with a corresponding increase in the 
price of natural gas from as low as $0.70/thousand cubic feet to as high as $3.44/thousand 
cubic feet. Additionally, and in contrast to the regressions using the price of electricity as 
the dependent variable, a state RPS is not significantly associated with the price of 
natural gas. This likely has to do with the design of an RPS—it is meant to encourage the 
development of renewable and alternative energies, and natural gas is not directly 
targeted in the regulation and so is unaffected. 
 
Regulation and the State Residential Energy Burden 
 
 Table 7 shows the results of the regression on state residential energy burden, 
outlined above. 
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Table 7: State Residential Energy Burden as the Dependent Variable 
 
 
 
 Part two of my analysis was to use the state residential energy burden variable as 
the dependent variable and move the electricity price and natural gas price variables to 
the right-hand side of the equation. I did this to understand, first, how regulations affect 
the prices of the electricity and natural gas used for residential energy and, second, how 
regulations and the prices of electricity and natural gas affect the energy burden.  
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 The pooled OLS estimation results in Table 5 indicate that regulatory restrictions 
and specific regulations are significantly associated with changes in the state residential 
energy burden. Of more interest, however, are the results of the fixed and random effects 
estimations.  
 Both the fixed and random effects estimations indicate a significant (0.001) and 
positive relationship between an increase in the number of regulatory restrictions, energy 
and environmental and all other, but that, as seen in Tables 5 and 6, the estimate is so 
small as to be almost zero. This means that though I find that the direction of my 
hypothesis is correct—energy and environmental regulation and all other regulation does 
have a positive relationship with the energy burden—the magnitude is very small. I 
conclude that regulatory restrictions are associated with an increase in the state residential 
energy burden, but that at the group level the increase is so small that it does not appear 
to be economically significant.  
 Though MATS had a significant relationship on the prices of electricity and 
natural gas, it does not have a significant relationship with the state residential energy 
burden. MATS, therefore, may only have a significant relationship to the state residential 
energy burden through the prices of electricity and natural gas. 
 CAIR has a significant relationship (0.001) with the state residential energy 
burden, but its implementation is associated with a small increase in the state residential 
energy burden of 0.24 percent.  
 Where phase three of the CWIS rule had a significant relationship with the prices 
of electricity and natural gas, it has no significant relationship to the state residential 
energy burden. Rather, phases one and two have significant relationships (0.001 and 0.01, 
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respectively) and the implementation of each phase of CWIS is associated with an 
increase in the state residential energy burden of less than one percent.  
A state RPS and a national recession are associated with similar changes in the state 
residential energy burden (0.08 and 0.07 percent, respectively).  
 Though regulations are associated with an increase in the prices of electricity and 
natural gas, only the price of electricity has a significant (0.001) relationship to the state 
residential energy burden in both the fixed and random effects estimations. Natural gas is 
significant (0.05) in the fixed effects estimation but not the random estimation. Electricity 
price is associated with a small, but positive, change in the state residential energy burden 
of 0.06 percent and, in the fixed effects model, natural gas price is associated with a 
small, almost zero, but positive change in the state residential energy burden.  
 
Modeling Regulation and Group Household Energy Burden 
 
 In my empirical analysis, I developed three measures of energy burden: state 
energy burden (discussed above), group household energy burden, and group household 
energy burden using national income quintiles.  
 I’ve previously discussed the results of my econometric analysis of regulation, 
electricity and natural gas prices, and the state energy burden. The regression estimates 
for the group household energy burden and the group household energy burden using 
national income quintiles are so similar to the econometric analysis of the state energy 
burden that discussing the conclusions here would be unnecessarily repetitive. I will, 
however, briefly explain the additional measures of energy burden I developed before 
concluding. 
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Group Household Energy Burden 
 
 As an additional approach to measuring residential energy burden, I used a group 
approach, where I assumed that residential energy expenditures are distributed equally 
across all households within each state and that each household had an income equal to 
the state median income. As is quickly apparent, such assumptions don’t describe the 
reality of households living with high energy burdens. 
 I calculated the group household energy burden as follows: I calculated the 
household residential energy burden by setting it equal to household residential energy 
expenditures divided by state median income, where household residential energy 
expenditures were equal to state residential energy expenditures divided by the number of 
households in the state. 
  
Group Household Energy Burden (using National Household Income Quintiles) 
 
 Because the group household energy burden I described above, by nature of the 
calculation, erases the variability of household energy burden, I used an additional 
measure to show the energy burden for households at different incomes levels. Like the 
measure I described above, this measure also assumes that residential energy 
expenditures are distributed equally across all households within a state, but the 
household income is divided into the average household income for each income quintile 
(from national quintile data).  
 Though this measure doesn’t reflect actual individual household energy burden, it 
is intuitively a more meaningful measure than the group household energy burden 
approach above. Using this measure, the residential energy burden for households at the 
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lowest income quintile is 15-20 percent of household income, while less than one percent 
of household income for those in the highest quintile. 
 Recall that an affordable measure of household energy burden is six percent of 
household income and a measure for a high energy burden is eleven percent of household 
income. This approach then indicates that households in the lowest income quintile live 
with high energy burdens and households in the second lowest income quintile have 
burdens that put them above the six percent threshold. 
 I calculated the group household energy burden, using national income quintiles, 
as follows: I calculated the household energy burden for each income quintile by setting 
it equal to household residential energy expenditures divided by household income at the 
given income quintile, where household residential energy expenditures equals state 
residential energy expenditures divided by the number of households in the state. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 Though I used three measures of group energy burden in my regression analyses, 
each with different strengths and weaknesses, the results were consistent and so I did not 
include the results for the second two measures.  
 Taken together, the regression results shown in Tables 5, 6, and 7 suggest that an 
increase in regulation is associated with an increase in the price of electricity, an increase 
in regulation is sometimes associated with an increase in the price of natural gas, an 
increase in the price of electricity is associated with a small increase in the state 
residential energy burden, the price of natural gas does not appear to have an 
economically significant association with the state residential energy burden, and that an 
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increase in regulation has a small but positive association with an increase in the state 
residential energy burden.  
 Additionally, the regressions indicate that though regulation as a whole is 
associated with a very small, almost zero, increase in the state residential energy burden, 
some regulations are more burdensome than others. Thus, it may be more helpful to say 
that certain energy and environmental regulations are significantly associated with 
increases in the energy burden rather than to say that energy and environmental 
regulations as a combined whole significantly affect energy burden. 
 These conclusions are of limited usefulness, however, and their real value is in 
indicating that the relationship between regulation, energy prices, and energy burden is 
complicated. Further research is needed. 
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Appendix B: Further Research 
 
 
My research resulted in more questions than answers. Because few economists 
have studied energy poverty, an opportunity exists for someone, or a handful of people, 
to have significant influence in this intersection of poverty, regulatory policy, and energy 
and environmental policy. The following is a list of research ideas I thought of while 
exploring my research question. 
 
State regulation and household energy burden 
 
Although I controlled for the presence of a state Renewable Portfolio Standard 
using a dummy variable that I switched on in the year the RPS was enacted, I did not 
explore how state energy and environmental regulations may affect energy burdens. Such 
an analysis would be a valuable addition to the study of regulation and energy poverty, 
mostly because the state-by-state variation could be captured more adequately. It may be 
helpful to begin with case studies of states with many energy and environmental 
regulations, such as California, and compare them to states that depend heavily on coal, 
such as Wyoming or West Virginia. 
 
Household transportation energy burden 
 
I restricted my analysis of the household energy burden to residential energy expenditures 
(electricity and natural gas). Residential energy expenditures are not the only component 
of a household’s total energy burden, however, and so studying the energy burden for 
households in the transportation sector may be a fruitful avenue for research. 
 
Household total energy burden 
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Total household energy burden is the household energy burden in the residential 
and transportation sectors. Understanding how households choose to allocate resources to 
residential versus transportation energy needs may shed light on how regulations affect 
consumer behavior. 
 
Low-Income Housing Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) 
 
Studying the history of LIHEAP and how and when funds are allocated to the 
states may be interesting research, especially from a Public Choice viewpoint. Research 
might include identifying the states that tend to receive the most funding and how 
logrolling in Congress affects funding amounts and allocations. 
Additional research might include studying the efficiency of LIHEAP allocations 
and whether the program is operating as originally intended. 
 
Effect of wind and solar energy growth on household energy burdens 
 
Running a regression like I’ve done above, but doing so by state (or utility 
system), with yearly data points for total state (or utility) megawatts of wind and solar, 
relative to annual average transmission and distribution charges on consumer bills, may 
show a strong relationship.12 
  
                                                      
12 This suggestion came from Steve Lomax, Director of Environmental 
Affairs at Koch Industries, Inc. I was put in contact with him after I spoke 
to someone asking for help understanding how regulation affects utilities. 
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Energy efficiency 
 
Energy Efficiency for All claims that “low-income households, renters, African-
American households, and Latino households paid more for utilities per square foot than 
the average household, indicating that they reside in less efficient housing” (Drehobl and 
Ross 2016, 4). The relationship between energy efficiency and energy poverty may be 
worth pursuing. 
 
The masking effect of subsidies 
 
Another area of research that would be helpful, though challenging, is working to 
understand how subsidies distort price signals. Understanding the magnitude of subsidies 
awarded to the energy sector and how those subsidies, as a hidden cost, disguise the real 
cost of any given energy source would be useful in the energy and environmental policy 
discussion. This research ties into energy poverty and the regressive effect of regulation 
literature if it shows that consumers pay more (through energy bills and taxes) and thus 
have less buying power.13 
In addition to the effect of subsidies to the energy sector, another line of research 
would pursue the effect of subsidized housing programs on home energy burdens. If, for 
example, housing policies that lower the cost of rent are not commensurately 
accompanied by policies that subsidize the price of residential energy, then drawing more 
                                                      
13 This idea is akin to research published by the Institute of Political 
Economy at Utah State University on the hidden costs of wind-, solar-, 
coal-, and natural-gas generated electricity. 
  
83 
people into housing they would otherwise not be able to afford would lead to an increase 
in the number of households living with a high energy burden.14  
                                                      
14 This idea was spurred by Hernandez and Bird’s section on the split 
incentive problem in their 2016 publication “Energy Burden and the Need 
for Integrated Low-Income Housing and Energy Policy.”  
